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Abstract
Most of the models that currently describe processes
related to mental illness stigma are based on individual-
level psychological paradigms. In this article, using a
sociological paradigm, we apply the concepts of struc-
tural discrimination to broaden our understanding of
stigmatizing processes directed at people with mental ill-
ness. Structural, or institutional, discrimination includes
the policies of private and governmental institutions that
intentionally restrict the opportunities of people with
mental illness. It also includes major institutions' policies
that are not intended to discriminate but whose conse-
quences nevertheless hinder the options of people with
mental illness. After more fully denning intentional and
unintentional forms of structural discrimination, we
provide current examples of each. Then we discuss the
implications of structural models for advancing our
understanding of mental illness stigma, including the
methodological challenges posed by this paradigm.
Keywords: Stigma, serious mental illness, socio-
logical structures.
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During the past decade, advocates and researchers alike
have described the adverse effects of the stigma of mental
illness on people having this label. For the most part, this
discussion has focused on explanatory models based on
individual or psychological levels. These models, which
have greatly increased our understanding of how to diminish
stigma's impact, explain stigma by examining the social-
cognitive elements of the stigmatizer, who perceives a stig-
matizing mark, endorses the negative stereotypes about peo-
ple with the perceived mark, and behaves toward the
marked group in a discriminatory manner. A macrosocial
level of analysis uncovers a separate set of factors that lead
to discrimination against people labeled as mentally ill. Two
such factors are the focus of this article: (1) policies of pri-
vate and governmental institutions that intentionally restrict
the opportunities of people with mental illness, and (2) poli-
cies of institutions that yield unintended consequences that
hinder the options of people with mental illness. The article
begins with a review of institutional and structural models
as they generally explain the experience of racial stigma and
discrimination. We quickly segue into specific examples of
these phenomena in terms of mental illness stigma. We then
explore the implications of structural levels of analysis for
further development of a research program that seeks to
improve the understanding of, and ultimately diminish, the
stigma of mental illness.
General Model of Structural
Discrimination
A better understanding of racism in America was achieved
when civil rights activists (Carmichael and Hamilton
1967; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 1981) and sociol-
ogists (Merton 1948; Friedman 1975; Hill 1988; Wilson
1990; Pincus 1996, 1999b) realized that discrimination
affects people of color in ways not explained by the direct
psychological effects of an individual's bigoted attitudes
and behavior. They called this structural or institutional
discrimination and realized that its effects might be either
intentional or unintentional. Intentional institutional dis-
crimination manifests itself as rules, policies, and proce-
dures of private and public entities in positions of power
that consciously and purposefully restrict rights and
opportunities.1 For example, Jim Crow laws, extending
'Some theorists distinguish institutional from structural forms of dis-
crimination (Pincus 1999a). However, given that institutions are fre-
quently included under the broader rubric of structures in sociological
research, we thought the distinction was unnecessary and use the terms
interchangeably. Instead, our discussion focuses on the heart of Pincus'
distinction, whether the sociological level of discrimination is intentional
or unintentional.
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from the end of the 19th to the middle of the 20th century,
were examples of public institutional discrimination
against people of color. These laws, largely enacted by
Southern States, explicitly undermined the rights of
African-Americans in such vital areas as employment,
education, and public accommodation. Although persons
carrying out the policy may not have intended these
effects, a group of powerful people at the top of an institu-
tion intended to diminish the opportunities of racial and
ethnic groups by passing laws or regulations (Mayhew
1968; Hill 1988; Pincus 1999ft).
There are, however, public and private sector poli-
cies whose consequences restrict the opportunities of
members of minority groups in unintended ways—
instances where discrimination seemingly results with-
out the conscious prejudicial efforts of a powerful few
(Feagin 1978; Hill 1988). For example, many universi-
ties and colleges use the SAT or ACT to limit admission
offers to students who have earned the highest scores
(Pincus 1999a). Given that African-American and
Hispanic students typically score lower than whites on
these tests, selective universities that rely on the SAT or
ACT for admissions are likely to prevent a dispropor-
tionate number of African-American and Hispanic stu-
dents from being admitted. It seems unlikely that per-
sons at the top of the organizations—in this case, college
administrators—intend to restrict the prospects available
to people of color. Nevertheless, the results of university
admissions policies limit the opportunities for people
because of their ethnic group status and the economic
and historical forces that have forged that group's place
in society (Merton 1948, 1957).
Examples From AIDS. One might argue that relevant
lessons about structural discrimination might be further
learned by studying the experiences of people with vari-
ous stigmatized health conditions (e.g., cancer, tubercu-
losis, syphilis, AIDS). A review of the literature sug-
gests, however, that social scientists have not applied the
idea to the stigma of health conditions other than AIDS.
Nevertheless, the experience of the stigma of AIDS is in
many ways similar to that experienced by people with
mental illness. Unlike with racism, the condition leading
to the stigma typically does not occur until later in life
and can often be hidden from the public. Hence, lessons
from AIDS vis-a-vis structural discrimination are rele-
vant to understanding this phenomenon in mental illness.
One interesting report noted how instances of structural
discrimination related to AIDS seemed to decrease from
the 1980s to the 1990s in the United States (Heywood
and Altman 2000). For example, during this period legis-
lation was passed that better protected the privacy rights
of people with AIDS. However, the authors noted that
unfortunately privacy rights actually worsened in much
of the developing world during this period. A second
study conducted by the United Nations Office on AIDS
measured similar concerns and found similar positive
trends in another Western nation (Dubois-Arber and
Haour-Knipe 2001). Examining legislation, written regu-
lations, and actual practices, the study, conducted in
Switzerland, revealed little institutional discrimination
against people with AIDS. The gist of these findings is
2-fold. First, health policy analysts and legislators
became aware of the harmful effects of institutional dis-
crimination. Second, this awareness seems to have
diminished the effects of this kind of discrimination for
people with AIDS, at least in some Western nations.
Intentional Structural Discrimination and Mental
Illness. A good example of intentional structural dis-
crimination from the public sector is legislatures that
enact laws restricting the rights and opportunities of
people with mental illness. A prominent example from
the private sector is the predominantly negative repre-
sentations of people with mental illness in the news
media. We consider each more fully in turn.
Law. One marker of institutional discrimination is
State legislature decisions that limit the rights and oppor-
tunities of people with mental illness. In 1989, Burton
(1990) searched the statutes in ah" 50 States for discrimi-
natory laws using keywords representing mental illness
(e.g., mentally ill, mentally incompetent). Ten years later,
a similar search was completed of an expanded data base
for the 50 States (Hemmens et al. 2002). The second
study sought to determine whether States had passed laws
restricting the civil rights of people with mental illness in
five areas: voting, holding elective office, serving jury
duty, parenting, and remaining married. Results of the two
studies are summarized in table 1. The authors of the stud-
ies note that this kind of survey is somewhat imprecise
because readers must infer the legislature's intent based
on analyses of just one or two keywords. Nevertheless,
interesting findings emerged when data were collapsed
into two categories based on whether laws targeted mental
illness or incompetence.
Note that approximately one-third of the 50 States
restrict the rights of an individual with mental illness to
hold elective office, participate in juries, and vote.
Withholding the right to vote seems especially harmful
given significant debate in the legal community about
whether this restriction is even appropriate for convicted
felons. Even greater limitations were evident in the family
domain. Between 42 and 52 percent of States limit the
right of people with mental illness to remain married.
More than 40 percent of States limited the child custody
rights of parents with mental illness.
Two other trends are noted from the table. First,
States generally were more restrictive of mental illness
482










Structural Discrimination Schizophrenia Bulletin, Vol. 30, No. 3, 2004
Table 1. Number of States restricting civil rights






































Note.—Adapted from Hemmens et al. (2002).
than incompetence. "Mental illness" is a term the public
seems to use as a general descriptor of people with psy-
chiatric disorders. "Incompetence" is a legal term defining
people who are unable to meet a community standard
based on their mental illness. This distinction is discussed
more thoroughly below. However, it is sobering to think
that legislatures seem to be restricting rights based on a
vague notion (or label) of mental illness rather than
demonstration that individuals are incompetent or unable
to perform in a manner that would qualify them for the
civil right.
The second trend is the lack of change in the number
of States with laws restricting civil rights based on mental
illness. Other than in the area of divorce law, there has
been no decrease in the number of States with laws that
restrict the rights of people with mental illness. This is
surprising given that concerns about stigma have become
a major priority of advocacy groups across the country
(Corrigan and Lundin 2001). The absence of change may
represent legislative inertia: once a law is passed, it gener-
ally remains on the books unless the legislature actively
votes to expunge it. What is needed in future research is
evidence about whether these laws are actually used in
State courts. For example, are there recent family court
records that cite laws restricting parent rights based on
mental illness?
News media. Mass communication sources includ-
ing the news media provide the fundamental frameworks
through which most Americans and other Westerners
come to perceive and understand the contemporary world
(Anderson 1997). Unfortunately, when the news media
portray a group in a negative light, they propagate preju-
dice and discrimination. As summarized in table 2, survey
analyses in several English-speaking countries have
shown that newspapers frequently frame mental illness in
a stigmatizing manner. Most articles discuss people with
mental illness in terms of dangerousness or violent crime.
Studies have shown that as many as 86 percent of stories
dealing with mental illness focus on violence (Shain and
Phillips 1991). Although more recent research suggests
that these kinds of stories are becoming less prevalent
(Wahl et al. 2002), at least a third of stories continue to
focus on dangerousness. Also, the vast majority of
remaining stories on mental illness focus either on other
negative characteristics related to people with the disorder
(e.g., unpredictability, unsociability) or on medical treat-
ments. Notably absent are positive stories that highlight
the recovery of many persons with even the most serious
mental illnesses (Wahl et al. 2002). Although reduction in
the proportion of negative stories is a positive trend, the
overrepresentation of stories that perpetuate the stereotype
of dangerousness is nevertheless an example of institu-
tional stigma. These stories reflect informal industry
norms applied by news editors and reporters choosing to
promote sensationalistic portrayals of mental illness and
violence.
Our brief discussion of the studies in table 2 reveals
the difficulty in assessing institutional stigma. Consider
the methodological and conceptual problems generated
by research on the news media. The first problem
relates to the validity of measurement. Are these kinds
of content analyses and keyword counts a valid way to
assess the prevalence of stigmatizing representations in
the news media? Although various keywords were used
as the basis for the content analysis, the studies in table
2 reported no effort to validate these codes as a compre-
hensive list of ways in which issues related to mental
illness may be reported in the news media. And studies
have not examined the stigmatizing valence of individ-
ual terms. For example, Wahl et al. (2002) argued that
newspaper stories using person-first language (e.g.,
"person with schizophrenia" rather than "schizo-
phrenic") were less likely to be stigmatizing (and actu-
ally could spread positive attitudes about mental illness)
than other terms. Unfortunately, Wahl et al. provided no
independent metric representing the relative impact of
various words. Nevertheless, repeated findings of a high
rate of stories about violence and mental illness seem to
support the conclusion that a significant segment of the
news media is perpetuating prejudicial images of people
with mental illness. There is also some concern about
the external validity of these analyses. Although the
studies in table 2 made some effort to sample a variety
of news sources, no systematic sampling plans were
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Table 2. Summary of studies completing survey analyses of newspapers for stigmatizing representa-
tions of mental Illness













Wahl et al. (2002)
Coded articles from the Canadian
Newspaper Index for "mental health"
Coded 2 Canadian newspapers
over 3 time spans using 7 keywords
Content analysis of British and
Scottish newspapers
Coded UPI stories using 5 keywords
Coded 43 stories from 4 newspapers








Coded 101 stories from 3 American 1989-1994
newspapers in terms of schizophrenia
Coded 300 stories from 6 American 1989
newspapers over 2 time spans using 1999
"mental illness" as the keyword
There was a largely negative image
of mental illness based on
dangerousness, unpredictability,
dependency, and unsociability.
There were frequent portrayals of
dangerousness and the need for an
authoritarian mental health system.
The most common story was violent
attacks on others.
Eighty-six percent of the stories
focused on violent crime.
Although there was a reduction in
violent crime stories from the 1983
UPI sample, more than 40 percent
of articles tied mental illness to
violence.
The most common themes were
pharmacological treatments and
scientific findings.
Negative themes such as
dangerousness dominated both
samples, although the number of
violent stories was reduced from
1989 to 1999.
Note.—UPI » United Press International. Adapted from Wahl et al. (2002).
evident so that a representative collection of news sto-
ries might be inferred. Methodological issues like these
need to be addressed in future research if definitive con-
clusions are to be made about news stories as markers
of institutional discrimination.
There is also a conceptual problem with using the
findings in table 2 as a proxy for institutional discrimi-
nation. Are newspapers presenting a biased and erro-
neous view of mental illness or one that reflects reality?
In other words, how accurate is the message? Some peo-
ple might argue that frequent stories on mental illness
and violent crime are not stigmatizing but rather reflect
the actual level of danger inherent in people with some
psychopathologies, especially psychotic disorders
(Torrey 1994; Satel and Jaffe 1998). Carefully controlled
epidemiologic evidence seems to support their assertion.
Research completed in the United States and Britain
shows a 2- to 6-fold increase in the rate of violence in
samples of people with mental illness compared to sam-
ples of people without mental illness drawn from the
general population (Swanson et al. 1990; Link et al.
1992; Stueve and Link 1997; Wessely 1997; Steadman et
al. 1998; Corrigan and Watson 2003). When considering
these numbers in terms of base rates, however, one finds
mental illness to be a poorer predictor of violence com-
pared with demographic variables like age, gender, and
ethnicity. When epidemiological data from general pop-
ulation samples are used, analyses show that although
mental illness may increase the likelihood of violence,
its effect is perhaps not as large as that of other demo-
graphic factors such as gender (Corrigan 2002). The dis-
crepancy between reality and perception must be better
understood if institutional discrimination in the news
media is to become a potent and useful construct in
understanding the harmful impact of stigma on people
with mental illness.
Unintentional Structural Discrimination and Mental
Illness. In some types of structural discrimination,
despite a commitment to neutrality, a policy or principle
may result in less opportunity for a stigmatized group
than for the majority (Pincus 1996, 1999&). For instance,
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public policy that favors good business and cost-effective
economic principles, both central to capitalism, would not
seem to favor particular groups. Nevertheless, there are
examples of unintended, discriminatory consequences
based on this value. Insurance companies, for example,
charge increased premiums in African-American commu-
nities where the crime rate is higher. Banks are less likely
to provide mortgages to buyers in African-American
neighborhoods where less collateral is available to secure
a loan. Although both of these decisions seem to represent
wise business practice—and do not seem to represent
prejudicial intent on the part of insurers and lending com-
panies—the result is still fewer financial resources being
available in African-American communities.
Link and Phelan (2001) extended this kind of eco-
nomic analysis in discussing examples of unintended
structural discrimination related to mental illness. They
argued, for example, that less money is allocated to
research on and treatment for psychiatric illnesses than
other health disorders because illnesses like cancer and
heart disease have dominated the American public health
agenda. In addition, many psychiatrists and other mental
health professionals opt out of the public service system,
which serves people with the most serious psychiatric
and substance abuse disorders. Salaries and benefits are
better in the private health sector, where providers are
more likely to treat relatively benign illnesses like
adjustment disorders and relational problems. Hence, the
quality of services for people with serious mental disor-
ders is often inferior to the quality of services for other
conditions.
Problems with mental health insurance parity are
another example of unintended structural stigma related to
mental illness. The Mental Health Parity Act (MHPA),
signed into law in 1997, required that lifetime and annual
limits on mental health benefits be set at a similar level as
medical and surgical benefits. However, there were
notable limitations to the passed version of the act. The
MHPA did not require employers to provide mental health
coverage. Companies with 50 or fewer employees were
exempt. Substance abuse disorders were not covered.
Employers who demonstrated that the MHPA would drive
up insurance costs by more than 1 percent could opt out.
As is often the case with structural discrimination,
this act, although intended to be neutral, resulted in less
opportunity for members of a particular group. First, the
act led to fewer financial resources being available for
psychiatric disorders, compared with medical illness,
thereby yielding diminished opportunity for people with
mental illness (Mercer 1998; Levinson and Druss 2000).
Second, this disparity did not seem to reflect explicit
prejudice on the part of Congress or the public. Most
members of both houses, regardless of political affilia-
tion, support equal care for mental health disorders, as
does the American public (Hanson 1998). Instead, lack
of support for many of the MHPA's provisions stems
from financial concerns that are frequently at the root of
other forms of structural discrimination: the MHPA
makes for bad business. The tension between wanting to
support treatment equity but not wanting to create a bad
business environment is evident in public attitude; one
review found that participants of national surveys on
parity, on one hand, highly endorsed the idea of equal
resources for mental health and medical diagnoses but,
on the other hand, did not support paying higher premi-
ums or redistributing funds from medical/surgical ser-
vices to mental health services to accomplish this goal
(Hanson 1998).
Disability Versus Label
Before discussing the implications of structural discrimi-
nation for further research on the stigma of mental illness,
we examine an important distinction: Does what we are
calling "discrimination" justly limit the privileges of dis-
abled people, or does it unjustly harm labeled
individuals! If one considers a precise meaning of incom-
petence or disability (Hahn 1984)—namely, because of
the symptoms or other limitations that result from a men-
tal disorder, a person is unable to demonstrate one or
more current life functions—dien it seems reasonable that
some people with psychiatric disabilities may not qualify
for some privileges and opportunities as long as the dis-
ability is manifest. A person who is paranoid and disori-
ented should probably not qualify for a gun permit. A per-
son with grossly substandard hygiene should probably not
be hired for a job that requires food handling. An impor-
tant and difficult task for lawyers, ethicists, activists, and
policy makers is the definition of situations where the
restriction of rights or privileges because of disability may
serve a larger social good.
Acknowledging the legitimacy of some institutional
laws, rules, or procedures that limit opportunities for peo-
ple with specific disabilities has implications for the
research agendas outlined above. Namely, researchers
examining instances of structural discrimination against
people with mental illness need to keep in mind that
sometimes the restriction may be justified and therefore
not qualify as an example of baseless discrimination. One
way to do this is to distinguish between limitations on the
rights of individuals based on disability and limitations
based on mental illness labels. This distinction is evident
in the legal example reviewed in table 1. Hemmens et al.
(2002) divided mental healdi-related laws in the table into
those that targeted either people with "mental illness" or
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people with "incompetence." Laws for incompetence
seem to fulfill a socially valuable and reasonable purpose,
assuming that government agents enforcing the law have
the capability to reliably assess whether an individual is
not competent enough to, for example, parent a child or
serve on a jury.
The social value of restricting rights because a person
is "mentally ill" is much more dubious. The term mentally
ill, as used in many of these laws, reflects the negative
effects of a label and not any measurable incompetence.
Consider, for example, how the use of the term mentally
ill to restrict rights could yield several examples of dis-
crimination. People with relatively benign psychiatric ill-
nesses such as adjustment disorders and phase of life
problems, as well as those with more serious disorders
who are adequately managing their illness, could lose
rights. Hence, researchers attempting to discern structural
examples of discrimination need to keep in mind this dis-
tinction.
Americans cherish their civil liberties. Hence, any
effort by the public or private sector to limit those liber-
ties based on disability due to psychiatric illness must be
constrained by clear rules or assumptions. Four that are
relevant and that affect research issues related to struc-
tural discrimination are discussed here.
Restricted Rights or Opportunities are Limited to
Those That, When Not Competently Completed, Will
Directly or Indirectly Harm Others. It is clear that not
being able to properly use a gun may likely lead to physi-
cal harm to self or others and that poor hygiene in a
restaurant could cause others to become physically ill. In
cases like these, the government has a public interest in
making sure that the disabilities of some people do not
harm others. Exceptions and limitations to rights like
these are implied in the "undue hardship" clause of the
Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA), which states that
reasonable accommodations need not be provided to a
person with a disability if the resources needed for the
accommodation would do harm given the capabilities of
the business. We extend this clause by stating that any
rightful opportunity that would be hindered by a psychi-
atric disability and cause public harm may justifiably be
restricted because of that disability. Note, however, that
the possible harm assumption suggests that any public
rights or privileges that do not harm others should not be
excluded by law or other institutional policy. For exam-
ple, access to and enjoyment of most public accommoda-
tions (e.g., beaches, parks, theaters, hotels, restaurants)
should not be restricted by disability or diminished func-
tioning. Hence, searching for examples of structural dis-
crimination should take into account the public harm con-
cern.
Clear Definition of the Disability on Which a Person's
Right is Withheld is Necessary. Disabilities that lead to
judgments of incompetence and restriction of rights must
be measurable using reliable and valid tools. These mea-
surements need to assess constructs that are based on a
comprehensive functional analysis that defines component
activities of a restricted right that cannot be competently
completed because of psychiatric disability. Hence, the
definition of incompetence related to a specific right or
opportunity must extend beyond vague targets, such as
psychotic symptoms, to specific skill deficits that com-
prise the area of concern (e.g., parental rights) and are
hindered by disabilities (e.g., inability to regularly serve
nutritious meals). Specific laws, rules, or regulations that
lack this kind of definition and corresponding assessment
strategy may be structural discrimination.
Adequate Supportive Services Must Be Provided to
Meet Competency Criteria. As stated in the "Restricted
Rights" section above, the ADA includes a second princi-
ple—reasonable accommodation—that is relevant to
understanding when rights and privileges can be withheld
because of disability: public and private institutions must
provide both environmental and interpersonal supports
that assist the person with disabilities to function success-
fully and enjoy the full range of social opportunities. The
idea of reasonable accommodation is based on sociopolit-
ical notions that all human competencies (those of people
with disabilities and people without disabilities) represent
an interaction of the person's ability to complete a task
and the resources of the environment in which this task
occurs (Hahn 1984). Note, for example, that without
many of the technological innovations of the 20th century,
few office workers, with or without disabilities, could
competently carry out their jobs. In this light, reasonable
accommodations are those tools or environmental sup-
ports that a person with disabilities needs to perform a
job.
According to the ADA, one cannot be considered
incompetent if these kinds of accommodations are not
provided. Although the ADA framers largely envisioned
reasonable accommodations as environmental supports
that assist those with ambulatory and sensory disabilities,
the Federal Government stated that reasonable accommo-
dations must also be applied to people with psychiatric
disabilities (U.S. EEOC 1997). The exact nature of these
accommodations continues to be worked out; neverthe-
less, some that have been mentioned for people with psy-
chiatric disabilities on the job include supervision (e.g.,
having job coaches to provide support and counseling at
work), job restructuring (e.g., reallocating marginal job
functions), workplace modifications (e.g., providing room
dividers or soundproofing to diminish distractions), and
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sick time (e.g., permitting the use of accrued paid leave or
unpaid leave for psychotherapy) (Behney et al. 1997).
Hence, provision of reasonable accommodations needs to
be considered when examining whether certain public or
private rules and regulations represent structural discrimi-
nation.
Note how structural discrimination causes circular
problems. The insufficient resources representing struc-
tural discrimination (e.g., failure to pass parity or to ade-
quately support public services) will hinder services that
provide reasonable accommodations. Without these ser-
vices and accommodations, the person may remain dis-
abled and more prone to the harm of discrimination.
The Right or Privilege is Reinstated When the
Disability Diminishes. Given the importance of civil lib-
erties to American culture, rights and opportunities that
are restricted because of disability should be reinstated as
soon as the specific disability is no longer relevant. This
assumes not only that adequate definitions and measure-
ment strategies exist for assessing the relevant disability
but also that mechanisms exist for the regular and timely
assessment of changes in the disability. At a minimum,
some process must be evident that guarantees speedy
assessment to persons with restricted rights who believe
that their disability (perhaps with reasonable accommoda-
tion) no longer makes them incompetent or harmful.
Implications for Further Research
In the introductory paragraph of this article, we briefly
alluded to the social-cognitive model of mental illness
stigma (i.e., stigmatizing cue, prejudice, discrimination)
as a backdrop for complementary structural paradigms.
The social-cognitive model also suggests fundamental
research strategies to test questions about stigma,
approaches that are widely found in the growing body of
research on mental illness stigma. Units of analysis in this
kind of research almost exclusively represent the individ-
ual and include proxies of cognitive content and
processes, as well as emotions, related to stigmatizing
attitudes plus the behavioral consequences of these atti-
tudes. Research designs that incorporate individual units
of analysis are largely experimental and survey based.
Structural discrimination involves processes that typi-
cally represent collective and macro-level units rather
than individuals (e.g., how State governments deprive
people of parental rights through laws or how the insur-
ance systems of National Governments limit mental
health benefits). The aggregate of individual properties
may serve as a proxy for macro-level constructs. For
example, an analytic unit representing State governments
and parental rights might be the number of suits filed
annually in Federal courts against specific family-related
laws. An analytic unit for nation-specific collections of
insurers might be the average premiums that the insured
pay per year for mental health benefits. As these examples
show, advancing research in this area would require a
comprehensive list of aggregate, continuous variables that
would represent the extent of structural discrimination.
Sociological methodologists note that analytic units
representing the aggregation of individual variables are
perhaps the methodologically and conceptually easiest
approach to modeling macro-level processes. Similarly,
categorical variables might be collected indicating
whether a law currently active within a State restricts
parental rights or whether a National Government has
enacted the equivalent of the MHPA.
Macro-level constructs and corresponding measures
provide an additional level of complexity to research
design (Coleman 1986; Liska 1990). How are the links in
causal models changed when macro-level variables are
added to the mix? Model A in figure 1 is an example of a
causal model for an individual-level paradigm of stigma
and is contrasted with a mixed causal model that includes
the structural paradigm of stigma (model B). Individual-
level models represent micro-to-micro links (model A).
Ample research has examined the relationship between
public attitudes and subsequent discriminatory behavior
outlined in model A (Corrigan, in press). These programs
of study examine the associations of micro levels of data.
Statistical models common to psychological research are
fairly robust at testing these associations in a rigorous and
valid manner.
Model B in figure 1 outlines what macro-level vari-
ables implied by structural discrimination add to causal
models of stigma. In particular, these models highlight
research questions that suggest how structural discrimina-
tion may affect attitudes that people with mental illness
have about themselves and their life opportunities. For
example, as a result of specific structural factors related to
parity, do individuals with mental illness have restricted
health care benefits? Does this restriction make individu-
als view mental health services as less effective? The
macro-to-micro link was an important research agenda of
sociologists in the first half of the 20th century (Faris and
Dunham 1939; Blau 1960). However, analyses of this
form diminished in the 1970s after a series of critiques
concluded that only a small amount of variance in indi-
vidual-level variables is attributable to macro-level vari-
ables (Alexander and Griffin 1976; Hauser 1977). For
example, little of the variance in measures of opportuni-
ties and outcomes lost by individuals with mental illness
may be explained by such structural-level variables as
whether a State government has enacted mental health
parity.
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Figure 1. Macro and micro levels of analysis In mental Illness stigma and discrimination
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Liska (1990) responded to this criticism by arguing
that although macro variables might account for relatively
minor variance in micro-level individual variables (espe-
cially compared with other psychological predictors), the
social scientist should not overlook the conceptual impor-
tance of macro-level variables per se. The presence of a
mental health parity law is still theoretically important to
understanding the impact of insurance benefits. Hence,
the interesting research question may be not whether
macro variables account for more variance than micro
variables in a group's experience of stigma but rather
whether "macro variable A" accounts for significantly
more variance than "macro variable B" and thereby seems
to have a bigger role as a macro variable in explaining the
individual's experience of stigma.
Another important question is how macro and micro
variables interact. For example, do self-stigmatizing
beliefs have a greater impact upon individuals living in
States with discriminatory laws or upon individuals in res-
idential programs located in disadvantaged neighbor-
hoods? In advancing research on mental illness stigma,
social scientists need to continue to examine the balance
between conceptual and methodological challenges
offered by the macro-level analyses suggested by struc-
tural discrimination.
Conclusion
Mental illness strikes with a two-edged sword. On one
side, people must struggle with the symptoms and dis-
abilities that prevent them from achieving many of their
life goals. On the other, the stigma of mental illness fur-
ther hampers their opportunities and aspirations. Hence,
efforts to understand the problems wrought by stigma
and to develop programs that will diminish its impact
will greatly advance the goals of people with mental ill-
ness. Models based on psychological paradigms have
helped to explain some of the causes and effects of men-
tal illness stigma. However, these models are limited in
terms of explaining more macro-level causes and media-
tors of stigma. Structural models of stigma help us to
understand how some forms of prejudice and discrimina-
tion arise at the level of the institution and reflect eco-
nomic, political, and historical forces. Central to under-
standing structural stigma is distinguishing whether it is
intentional or unintentional. The latter seems to reflect
contemporary social structures that are reinvigorated by
past forces that originally represented intentional institu-
tional discrimination.
A structural model of discrimination has significant
implications for the stigma research agenda and for devel-
oping programs that seek to diminish the stigma.
Structural models reintroduce the methodological conun-
drums represented by the micro-to-macro link. Structural
models also challenge the effectiveness of such individ-
ual-focused antistigma strategies as education and contact
and instead suggest that radical social policies like those
embodied in affirmative action are necessary. Note, how-
ever, that methodological challenges such as those engen-
dered by structural models are necessary to more fully
expand explanations of stigma and strategies for reducing
it. Only with this kind of expanded scholarship can a bet-
ter understanding of stigma be achieved.
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